A second more specific or limited ambition might be to revise and polish up a code of practice analogous to the Helsinki Code or the Nuremberg Code or the MRC Code relating to experimentation on human beings. But codes tend to codify what is already believed in by responsible and serious-minded people, and they are perhaps too generally worded to help in real life in particular cases, even if you gave some of these Codes a bit more of a cutting edge.
I suppose that ideally what we would like to get out of a Symposium like this is something we cannot actually achievea formuiary of conduct or some kind of equation of conduct which could be applied to individual cases. By an 'equation of conduct' I mean a statement containing blank spaces which becomes an exact specification of professional conduct after filling in the blanks and specifying name, age, sex and religion of the patient, the condition from which he suffers, the proposed remedy, and so on. It would then become a specific formula to guide your conduct on that particular occasion.
That is th-e most we could hope for, but we also know perfectly well that nothing of the kind could ever be achieved because of the singularity or the uniqueness of every real-life situation with which the clinician is confronted. Clinicians always insistand obviously rightlythat every patient differs from every other patient. Of course, we knew that already; it is a genetic truism. But, above all, every patient differs from every other patient in ways that are relevant to the kind of treatment which he should receive. This is certainly true of his physical constitution, genetical make-up and reactivity to drugs. It is true a fortiori if the nature and likely success of treatment are also significantly influenced by the moral and intellectual resources of the patient, by his family situation, by his income, by his prospects in life and by his chances of happiness or his capacity for happiness. Obviously, one cannot formularize clinical decisions that depend on so many variables.
In spite of this, I must echo one point of Professor Henry Miller's. In spite of the gravity of the problems you are now faced with, most of them do not seem to me, as a layman, to differ from everyday medical problems except in their degree of gravity, except in the scale of the demand which they make on the insight, understanding and technical skill of the clinician and, of course, in the scale of their cost to the National Health Service. They are not problems of an entirely new kind.
Not even the problem of the choice of subjects for treatment is new. What is new is that clinicians have to exercise a choice made necessary by economic considerations and national resources.
There has always been choice, but whereas hitherto it has been determined by the means of the patient, now, in the context of the National Health Service, it is determined by the means of the nation. The choice has always been there, but now the choice is yours. I see no way at all of relieving this burden on the clinician. The clinician will simply have to face the fact that his task is indeed getting much tougher, much more exacting, much farther removed from technicalities of professional practice itself. This is one of the facts of life the clinician will have to grapple with in future. I see no possible method of getting round it. May I at the outset extend the warm thanks of the Society to those who have so generously contributed to this Symposium, and say how interesting and valuable both the papers and the subsequent discussion have been.
REFERENCE
My role is not that of a contributor to the Symposium. It is simply to highlight by a general survey and critical assessment some of the problems which have today been discussed. It would be improper for me to stress my personal views, but perhaps I may be permitted some general comments which go beyond a strictly judicial summing up; although even if I attempted this I could do so in the confident knowledge that I should not be faced with an appeal based on its defects.
We are perhaps the most introspective of professions, and it is not surprising, in the light of the explosive advances in medical knowledge and technical skills, that we are currently taking a renewed and penetrating look at the morality of our practices and procedures.
Within the past year or two there have been three major (and several smaller) conferences dealing with various aspects of this theme. The American Medical Association sponsored the First National Congress of Medical Ethics in Chicago in 1966, the Ciba Foundation held a Symposium on Ethics in Medical Progress with special reference to organ transplantation, and last May the French Ordre National des Medecins held an international conference on 'Morales Medicales' dealing especially with the physician's personal responsibility in our contemporary setting. What has emerged today (and I do not propose to refer to individual contributors since similar points were made by many) and has been confirmed from the other discussions is first, that whilst, as Professor Carl Taylor once observed, 'respect for the sanctity of human life is the underlying value of the medical ethic', the approach to its achievement varies; and secondly, that whether an act is ethical must be judged in the total context of all relevant circumstances.
There is no logical proof that one act is ethically superior to another. This can be decided, it is suggested, only on a system of values which is acceptable to an enlightened profession and public. Hence, despite the acceptance of some traditional and eternal truths, our moral values and standards vary in different ages, as evidenced, for example, by current views on contraception and abortion.
In which fields do ethical problems present for the doctor? We have heard reference made to the doctor's duty to his patient, to the society in which he lives, to his professional brethrenwithout which it is suggested that the currency of medical practice would be debased, and to humanity at large, especially in the field of human experiment, and, indeed, to the animal kingdom, whose members play so important a role in advancing medicine.
The stress, however, today has been on the doctor's responsibility to the individual, how far the needs of society should outweigh the needs of the individual (a topic fraught with anxiety as the history of Nazi Germany illustrates), and the cost of life-saving measures, especially those recently introduced, such as hmmodialysis and organ transplantation.
Some have today urged the continuing primacy of the individual, as did Hippocrates. They deny that 'the greatest good for the greatest number' can ever outweigh the needs of an individual; that is, that the individual good is always more important than the common good. For them any alternative tenet would demand that they 'play God'. But are there no circumstances in which the interests of society rightly challenge those of the individual? A doctor must notify patients, even if they object, with certain infectious diseases and the law limits the mobility of such patients. Again, if a doctor is consulted by someone whom he believes may have committed a serious criminal offence, and he conceals that knowledge, he is guilty of what the lawyers call 'misprision of felony', though Lord Denning in a recent judgment suggested that there may be circumstances in which a doctor may claim in good faith that he was under a duty to keep his patient's disclosures confidential, though other learned judges have expressed contrary opinions.
But placing decisions to be made by the doctor in the larger framework of the value structure in human society, the major dilemmas which he faces are two. First, when the limited resources of the State fail to provide all necessary medical care so that priorities must be determined; and secondly, in deciding when the time has come to discontinue artificial aids to survivala problem not of cost only, but of immediate urgency in many fields, both economic and medical, as exemplified, for example, by organ transplantation. We can, of course, be certain that our resources and opportunities will change with time, but this does not relieve us of the duty of seeking an answer to our immediate problems. Some, of course, deny that our resources for health need be limited. It has been urged that another £500,000,000 spent on the Health Service would dispel our financial anxieties and problems of medical priorities. But this overlooks that the State must apportion its total resources in money and manpower to all its responsibilities; to housing (and no one who has seen the conditions in which vast numbers of our citizens live would doubt that more money spent on housing and sanitation would improve the Nation's health, and diminish the demand for medical care); to educationthere is a clamant demand for more teachers, and many schools, as well as hospitals, which were built in the last century are still in use with their indescribably inadequate accommodation, toilet and washing facilities, &c., and yet who would deny that better education promotes health; to the provision of food supplements, and so forth. But it is, of course, entirely proper that we doctors should advocate as cogently as we can that more money be spent on health, for there are strong voices urging the needs in other fields. It has been argued that we could easily provide the additional money needed for health services if we were to cut our defence expenditure. But doctors who assert this should remember that they are making political decisions on the apportionment of our national income, and that in this context they speak with no greater authority than any other educated and intelligent citizen.
Is not our duty as doctors to ensure that we make the best use of our limited resources? Do we, for example, use our hospital beds to their best advantage? Do we keep patients in hospital for social rather than medical reasons? Do we manage our hospitals so that there are no unnecessary delays in carrying out investigations or treatment? Do we never prescribe unnecessarily large quantities of drugs? and so forth. There is clearly much of our work which might repay selfexamination and criticism.
Many examples have been quoted in which priorities have to be determined. Interesting figures have been provided on the costs of renal dialysis. Are these justifiable if they postpone for several months or even years an operation for a disabling hernia in an otherwise healthy young man? Again, since himodialysis can be available to only a small fraction of those who may benefit from it, how shall we decide who shall live and who shall die? This Symposium has, indeed, revealed many of the considerations which lead to the answer to this question. Again, should lifesaving measures be available to the hopeless victims of cancer, strokes, mental disease, and to the very aged? Even if we follow Clough's The Latest Decalogue: Thou shalt not kill; but need'st not strive Officiously to keep alive, how do we decide when to withhold treatment or artificial means of continuing life? We have been told today how a patient with grave cerebral injury, leading a vegetative life for several months, may yet survive and become a useful member of society; and practising doctors must know of many cases in which death seemed inevitable yet the patient made a good recovery. Again, who can tell whether overnight a remedy may become available for a disease whose victims are now doomed to certain death? Yet, in determining a course of action, are we not justified in taking into account the overwhelming probabilities afforded by contemporary knowledge ? As Sherrington observed: 'Science, nobly, declines as proof anything but complete proof; but common sense, pressed for time, accepts and acts on acceptance.' In considering the ethical problems raised by organ transplantation it has been emphasized that here the doctor has a double responsibilityto the donor as well as to the recipient. True it is that the recipient is grateful for a life regained, but serious medical risks remain. If the donor suffers, the recipient may well harbour feelings of guilt. And though the donor may glow in the warmth of sacrifice, he too faces the hazards of surgery and anesthesia, and the increased risk of living with one kidney. Some donors, indeed, have been left with a sense of mutilation and organ deprivation. The question has also been raised whether, in his keenness, the doctor has exerted undue influence, or minimized the risk in order to obtain the donor's consent to yield one of his kidneys.
These and seveial other problems involving ethical decisions and questions of priority have today been discussed. It is perhaps pertinent to recall that where there have been limited resources, determining priorities is no new problem. When penicillin, streptomycin and cortisone were first introduced, decisions had to be taken, usually by one doctor, which applications, of very many, to use these drugs should be granted.
How then are we to arrive at a system of values which will enable us to reach decisions on major ethical problems? I have earlier paraphrased A J Ayer's comment that: 'We find that argument is possible on moral questions only if some system of values is presupposed.' We have heard directly or indirectly of many such systems today which reflect both current and past major ethical teachings.
There are those who accept that there may be found in the universe certain absolute and immutable principles which represent God's wishes for man; that these have existed since the beginning of time, and that they represent a natural law which man can attest through insight, reason and tradition. Such a concept, it should be added, is not confined to one faith or sect. But whenever it has been proposed it has led to an authoritarian code of ethicscertain, rigid, inflexibletending to have little or no regard for individual variations.
Another approach has been the empirical, which contends that we derive all our concepts, including moral principles, from experience, and this should be as wide as possible. Perhaps an extreme example lies in the suggestion of Dr Leo Shatin, Professor of Psychiatry at the New Jersey College of Medicine, who proposes that physicians, when confronted by such problems as who shall be given the chance to live, and who left to die, should be relieved of making decisions on their own responsibility but that 'the choice of patients should be determined by the values that society places on a given person', and he suggests that a scale of such values might be worked out through a public opinion survey.
There is, however, a third approach, which is perhaps closely related to the pragmatism of C S Peirce, who urges that moral values must be interpreted in the context of the total situation. Like science, pragmatism rejects absolutes and certainties and accepts only probabilities. It recognizes that our concepts of right and wrong are relative, and in no sense absolute and predetermined, and it urges that continuing enquiry, such as today's, is necessary so that our moral judgments of tomorrow may be better than those of today. This belief is closely related to that of William James who named it 'meliorism' -a belief that the world could be improved.
In reaching judgments on medico-ethical problems, such as transplantations and when to cease striving to keep alive, the principles which have been stressed in today's discussion are first, freedom for the patient or his relatives to choose when given all the relevant facts; and secondly, respect for the quality and dignity of human life (though perhaps not life at all costs) and for all that concerns one's fellow men. If these be accepted, the physician (and indeed the legislator and the lay citizen) should in reaching decisions pose three questions:
(1) Has this person (or, if he is incapable, his guardian) been given all the necessary knowledge, and freedom to decide whether he accepts the course of action recommended, that is, is the consent informed, intelligent and voluntary? It has been held by some that 'every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body'. But can consent change what is intrinsically wrong into a right ? (2) Is my recommendation based on the best scientific probabilities?
(3) Is my proposed course of action one that I would advise for someone I love, and if I were similarly circumstanced would I wish this done for me?
Of course, even the most sincere application of these questions may not yield an agreed course of action. For example, there have been reports recently of hemicorporectomy, that is, amputation of the lower half of the body through the lumbar spine for advanced pelvic carcinoma. I personally would resist such a procedure, for I have earlier urged that the feasibility of an operation is not the best indication for its performance. But I do not doubt that many surgeons would conscientiously regard such an operation as not only possible but also indicated. They, though not necessarily others, would be justified in advising it if the patient agreed after learning all the consequences.
From what I have heard today it may be that there would be general agreement that it is these three questions which should be uppermost in reaching ethical judgments on the problems we have today discussed under the title of 'The Cost of Life', if our answers are to be untrammelled by codes, traditions, verbal sophistry, special pleading, and the like. Our judgments then should be, and should be seen to be, valid and wise.
